Pointing Fingers Without Proof: Elements Of A Claim Under Section 11 Of The Securities Act Of 1933 by Mirsky-Terranova, Sarah A.
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
5-1-2014
Pointing Fingers Without Proof: Elements Of A
Claim Under Section 11 Of The Securities Act Of
1933
Sarah A. Mirsky-Terranova
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Mirsky-Terranova, Sarah A., "Pointing Fingers Without Proof: Elements Of A Claim Under Section 11 Of The Securities Act Of 1933"
(2014). Law School Student Scholarship. 534.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/534
 1  
 
 
POINTING FINGERS WITHOUT PROOF: ELEMENTS OF A CLAIM UNDER  
SECTION 11 OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Plaintiffs making claims under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933
1
 (hereinafter, the 
“Securities Act” or “Act”) must demonstrate that the defendants communicated statements of 
belief or opinion on registration statements
2
 that were “both objectively false and disbelieved by 
the defendant at the time” they were expressed. 3 A registration statement is “a legal document 
filed with the SEC to register securities for public offering that details the purpose of the 
proposed public offering.”4 The Securities Act imposes liability on certain persons who have 
fiduciary duties to the corporation if the registration statement contains a material 
misrepresentation when it becomes effective.
5
 Recently, however, the Sixth Circuit drastically 
lowered the bar for these types of securities claims, holding that section 11 imposes strict 
liability. Thus, in the Sixth Circuit, a plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant intended 
to communicate a false opinion or belief in the registration statement.
6
 This holding shied away 
from prior holdings in the Second and Ninth Circuits, creating a controversial split over the 
pleading requirements of section 11.
7
 The difference in precedents focuses on precisely what a 
                                                          
1
 15 USC § 77K.  
2
 The Circuit Split concerns the pleading requirements for liability concerning “soft” information in a registration 
statement. Such information includes “opinions, ideas, rumors, economic projections, statement of management’s 
future plans, and market commentary.” Mitchell A. Peterson, Information: Hard and Soft (Kellog School of 
Management, Northwestern University) (Preliminary and Incomplete) (July 2004). 
3
 Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2011); see Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 
1095-96 (1991).  
4
 http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/r/registration-statement.  
5
 James D. Cox, et al., Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials 151 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 7th ed. 
2013).  
6
 Ind. State Dist. Council v. Omnicare, Inc., 719 F.3d 498 (6
th
 Cir. 2013).  
7
 Id.  
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plaintiff should be required to prove when alleging a section 11 claim based on a statement of 
opinion or belief
8
 communicated in a registration statement.  
 In Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp, Ltd.,
9
 the Second Circuit upheld a lower court’s dismissal 
of the complaint because the plaintiff failed to allege with particularity that defendant made 
materially misleading statements and omissions. The information in the registration statement 
can result in a section 11 claim only if the complaint successfully demonstrates that the 
statements were both subjectively and objectively false and misleading.
10
 While the Second and 
Ninth Circuits correctly held that a plaintiff must prove that defendant’s misstatement was both 
objectively and subjectively false and/or misleading
11
, Courts should further add “loss 
causation”12 and “scienter”13 as required elements for plaintiff to prove. Therefore, if the 
plaintiff did not suffer some kind of monetary loss; and if the defendant did not intentionally plan 
to defraud the shareholder, then the plaintiff (shareholder) should have no claim.
14
 Reconciling 
the circuit split and creating a cohesive list of pleading requirements is the underlying theme of 
this Comment. 
 The first section of this Comment explores how and why the Securities Act of 1933 was 
passed, and explains the legal definition of a “security.”15 Additionally, it will explain what a 
                                                          
8
 See supra note 1.  
9
 551 F.3d 1156 (9
th
 Cir. 2009). 
10
 Id. at 1162; see Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1095-96 (1991) (holding that “proof of mere 
disbelief or belief undisclosed should not suffice for liability . . .”). 
11
 Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2011); Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp, Ltd., 551 F.3d 1156, 1161 
(9th Cir. 2009).   
12
 Loss causation “requires a showing "that the misrepresentations or omissions caused the economic harm." In re 
Catanella & E.F. Hutton & Co., Sec. Litigation, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1414 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (quoting Schlick v. Penn-
Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir.1974) 
13
 Scienter can be proven by establishing “knowledge or recklessness on the part of defendant[] . . .” In re Catanella, 
583 F. Supp. at 1404. 
14
 This controversial split creates several public policy concerns that will need to be examined in great detail to 
prevent an influx of litigation in the courts and the need for unification in the pleading requirements that plaintiff 
must establish in order to make a successful claim under § 11.  
15
 A security is a fungible, negotiable financial instrument that represents some type of financial value. 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/security.asp.  
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registration statement is, what information the document should disclose and how and why a 
plaintiff would bring a section 11 claim. This section also introduces this author’s reasons for 
why a plaintiff, when establishing a section 11 claim, should be required to prove several 
elements, rather than merely “pointing fingers” – keeping in mind that every story has three 
sides.  
 The second section of this Comment discusses in detail the Second
16
 and Ninth Circuit
17
 
cases, as well as the Sixth Circuit case that created the split.
18
 The third and final section of my 
Comment analyzes the need for additional legal components – loss causation19 and scienter20– 
that a plaintiff should be required to prove in order to establish a claim under section 11 of the 
Act. Requiring plaintiffs to prove these additional elements will create parity between section 11 
of the Securities Act and both section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
21
 and SEC 
Rule 10b-5.
 22
   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2011). 
17
 Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp, Ltd., 551 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2009).   
18
 Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991). 
19
 See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see infra. Part IV. 
20
 Id.  
21
 “In the aftermath of the 1929 stock market crash, Congress enacted § 10(b) of the Act as part of a wave of federal 
legislation intended to address the insufficiency of the common law in protecting investors from insider trading. E. 
Livingston B. Haskell , NOTES: "Disclose-or-Abstain" Without Restraint: The Supreme Court Misses the Mark on 
Rule 14e-3 in United States v. O'Hagan, 55 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 199, 206-7 (1998). 
22
 Rule 10b-5 states: It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To 
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit on any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 17 C.F.R. 
240.10b-5 (1997). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Welcome to the World of Securities: The Securities Act of 1933 & the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 
 
 Following the Great Depression in the early part of the 20
th
 century, the world was 
introduced to the very first securities act – the Securities Act of 1933.23 The Securities Act 
regulates the public offering and sale of securities in interstate commerce. So, one might ask , 
what exactly is a security? Is it something that secures your money? The answer, all too common 
in the law is - kind of. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a security24 as: “Collateral given or 
pledged to guarantee the fulfillment of an obligation; esp., the assurance that a creditor will be 
repaid any money or credit extended to a debtor.”25 In simpler terms, a security is an investment. 
For instance, if you purchase stock in Twitter, you are likely hoping that you can make some 
money – so you are hoping that the stock price will continue to rise so that when you sell it, you 
can make a profit. Securities law becomes significantly more complex than this, but the basic 
premise holds throughout. 
                                                          
23
 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.  
 
 
 
24
 The formal definition of a security under the United States Code provides: 
“The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, 
security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate 
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust 
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, 
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a 
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any 
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, 
or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the 
value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a 
national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any 
interest or instrument commonly known as a “security”, or any certificate of 
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, 
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the 
foregoing. 
15 U.S.C. 77(b)(a)(1) 
25
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1158 (9th ed. 2010).  
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 The Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”)26 also regulates the securities market. 
Although similar to the Securities Act, the Exchange Act is primarily concerned with regulating 
the secondary trading market and its participants. It created the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, (“SEC”) giving the SEC the authority to regulate the securities market to protect 
investors against fraudulent or discriminating practices. While the Securities Act and the 
Exchange Act regulate different types of behavior, the same type of conduct that would cause a 
violation of SEC Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act will likely cause a section 11 claim under 
the Securities Act.
27
 When a plaintiff alleges that defendant has violated section 11 – and the 
complaint “sounds in fraud,” plaintiff should be required to meet the following requirements28: 
[1] the “heightened pleading” requirement of Rule 9(b), [2] a subjective element, requiring proof 
that a defendant knew the statement made in the registration statement was false; [3] proof 
establishing that an objective, reasonable person would have disbelieved the information given in 
the registration statement was true; [4] scienter; and [5] loss causation.  
B. §11 of the Securities Act, §10b of the Exchange Act & SEC Rule 10b-5 
 “The central objective of the Securities Act is the preparation of a registration statement 
for securities offered to the public.”29 The following information is what needs to be included: 
[1] information regarding the company that is offering the securities to the public. This includes 
management and compensation information, an overview of the company, information pertaining 
                                                          
26
 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.  
27
 Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2004) 
28
 Several district and circuit courts have held that in order for a defendant to be held liable, plaintiff must prove that 
the information in the registration statement was both subjectively and objectively false and misleading. Further, for 
a complaint that “sounds in fraud” – meaning when the plaintiff alleges that defendant fraudulently provided 
misleading and false information in the registration statement; plaintiff must establish his allegation[s] with 
“heightened particularity” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). See, e.g., Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. 
Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1095-96 (1991); Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp, Ltd., 551 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 2011); Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1131 
(2d Cir. 1994); In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Secs. Litig., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
29
 James D. Cox, et al., Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials 136 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 7th ed. 
2013). 
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to any outstanding common stock, prices of that stock within the past two fiscal years, the 
number of shareholders of that stock, and the number of dividends for each class of stock; [2] the 
company’s distribution of its proceeds – including any future plans for those proceeds; [3] an 
explanation of the securities being offered to the public – including the “rights, privileges and 
preferences” of such security; and [4] supporting documents and exhibits, including the 
company’s bylaws, articles of incorporation , the attorney’s opinion with regard to the “legality 
of the securities registered,” and other supporting information.30 
 Section 11 of the Securities Act holds liable a defendant who gives materially false or 
misleading information in a registration statement.
31
 Similarly, section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act and corresponding SEC Rule 10b-5 prohibit deceptive practices in the buying or selling of 
securities.
32
 Both section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are “grounded on the notion of fraud.”33 
Section 10(b) grants the SEC power to regulate manipulative 
or deceptive devices connected with securities transactions in 
an attempt to preserve the public interest and to protect 
investors. . .  [B]ased on this authority, the SEC promulgated 
Rule 10b-5, a general antifraud provision that the SEC 
utilizes to enforce the prohibition on insider trading.
34
  
 
 Furthermore, to state a successful claim for a violation of section 10(b), a plaintiff must 
allege: 
(1) the existence of a material misrepresentation (or 
omission), (2) made with scienter (i.e., "a wrongful state of 
mind"), (3) in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security, (4) on which the plaintiff relied, and (5) which was 
causally connected to (6) the plaintiff's economic loss.
35
 
 
                                                          
30
 Id.  
31
 15 USC § 77K 
32
 15 USC § 78j; 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5.  
33
 Richard J. Morgan, Insider Trading and the Infringement of Property Rights, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 79, 83 (1987).  
34
 E. Livingston B. Haskell , "Disclose-or-Abstain" Without Restraint: The Supreme Court Misses the Mark on Rule 
14e-3 in United States v. O'Hagan, 55 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 199, 206-7 (1998). 
35
 Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 633 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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 To state a successful claim for a violation of Rule 10b-5 . . . 
 
. . . [t]the elements of a civil cause of action and a criminal 
prosecution are similar. Both require a false statement or an 
omission of a material fact; however, scienter is required for 
criminal liability to attach. For civil liability, the plaintiff 
need only prove reliance that is causally related to the 
plaintiff's injury.
36
 
 
 The core dispute, however, arises in section 11’s pleading requirements – as the Sixth 
Circuit has recently created a split having determined that the statute provides for strict liability – 
attaching liability to a defendant for a false statement made in the registration statement, 
irrespective of defendant’s knowledge that the statement[s] was incorrect.37 
C. The Requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) 
 “[R]ule 9 requires that ‘in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.’”38 “The textbook definition of 
fraud is: (1) a false representation of material fact, (2) defendant's knowledge that the 
representation is false, (3) an intent to induce reliance, (4) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff, and 
(5) damages.”39 It has been widely held that Rule 9(b) applies to a section 11 claim that “sounds 
in fraud.”40 Despite public policy arguments to the contrary, a plaintiff does not ordinarily need 
to meet the heightened pleading
41
 requirement of Rule 9(b) when bringing a section 11 claim 
because the “plain language of the statute does not include fraud or mistake as an element of a 
                                                          
36
 Joseph Conahan, et al., Securities Fraud, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1041, 1046 (2003).  
37
 Ind. State Dist. Council v. Omnicare, Inc., 719 F.3d 498, 505 (6th Cir. 2013). 
38
 Christopher Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 551, 562-63 (Dec. 2002) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
9(b)).  
39
 Id. at 565.  
40
 See infra note 53; see, e.g., Ind. State Dist. Council v. Omnicare, Inc., 719 F.3d 498, 503 (6th Cir. 2013); see, e.g., 
Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp, Ltd., 551 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2009).   
41
 In order to plead with “heightened particularity,” a plaintiff must prove: “. . . [w]hat is false or misleading about a 
statement, and why it is false.” Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp, Ltd., 551 F.3d at 1161.  
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section 11 claim.”42 If, however, the plaintiff is alleging that defendant “intended to defraud” the 
plaintiff by making a false statement, a plaintiff must meet the heightened pleading requirement, 
but therefore, wouldn’t be alleging a section 11 claim. Rule 9(b) can become quite tricky in this 
context because there has been widespread debate as to whether or not a plaintiff should be 
required to adhere to the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b) since a section 11 claim 
does not require the plaintiff to prove fraud or scienter as an element of such a claim.
43
 Although 
the thrust of this Comment is not specifically aimed at the applicability of Rule 9(b), it should be 
mentioned that when a plaintiff brings a claim under §11, that plaintiff should be required to 
plead his allegations with particularity. Otherwise, it would seem as though a plaintiff can 
establish a successful claim against a defendant regardless of whether or not the plaintiff has any 
proof to support such an allegation. Therefore, when bringing a §11 claim, a plaintiff should be 
required to meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) regardless of whether or not 
the plaintiff’s claim sounds in fraud.  
D. The Rule of “3” 
 As we all should have heard, there are three sides to every story – yes, three, not two. The 
plaintiff has one side of the story – the story that will do nothing but point fingers and reflect the 
defendant in the most negative and the poorest light possible. Then, we have the defendant’s side 
of the story – possibly fluffed to allow the listener or reader to feel the smallest ounce of 
sympathy, leaving us with that bit of doubt as to the guilt or fault of the defendant. Then, there is 
a third side of the story – the absolute, objective truth regarding the contested matter. The 
absolute truth is to be determined as closely as possible by the courts. Courts, however, do not 
always find the truth, because courts inevitably will not always make the proper determination. 
                                                          
42
 Krista L. Turnquist, Note: Pleading Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2395, 
2398 (June 2000).  
43
 Id.  
 9  
 
This is precisely what happened in Ind. State Dist. Council v. Omnicare.
44
 The Sixth Circuit 
strayed from the long-held rule that a plaintiff must prove both subjective and objective intent to 
hold the defendant liable. Courts in the past, particularly the Second and Ninth Circuits, had held 
that, in a case pleading fraud, the plaintiff must prove “that the statements were both objectively 
and subjectively false and misleading.”45 The Sixth Circuit knowingly created a jurisprudential 
split.
46
 Because of this, the U.S. Supreme Court may be required to resolve the split in an effort 
to prevent the many problems that will arise should courts allow a plaintiff to sue a defendant 
pursuant to section 11 without proving intent. Ultimately, under the Sixth Circuit’s standard, 
plaintiffs can “point fingers without proof” and come out on top. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Circuit Split: How low should courts go with liberal pleading standards to 
establish a §11 claim? 
1. The Second Circuit: Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp. 
 In Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp.
47
, the plaintiff alleged that defendant, Regions Financial 
Corporation (hereinafter “Regions”), a regional bank holding company, violated section 11 by 
negligently delivering “false and material misrepresentations” in its registration statement for the 
purpose of making a public offering of securities.
48
 In November 2006, Regions acquired 
AmSouth Bancorporation (hereinafter “AmSouth”) – valued at nearly $10 billion.49 Following 
the acquisition, Regions filed its annual Form 10-K having reported an $11.5 billion valuation of 
                                                          
44
 719 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2013). 
45
 Rubke, 551 F.3d at 1162.  
46
 The Circuit Court neglected to follow the Second and Ninth Circuits – and neglected to follow the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Virginia Bankshares, creating a brand new circuit split that may cause great controversy in the near future.  
47
 655 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2011).  
48
 Id. at 108.  
49
 Id. at 107.  
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goodwill.
50
 The 10-K additionally stated that Region’s loan loss reserves were significantly 
increased from $142.4 million to $555 million.
51
  
 The following year, in April 2008, Regions Financing Trust III (the “Trust”), a subsidiary 
of Regions, “issued 13.8 million shares of . . . hybrid securities . . . in a registered public 
offering” (the “offering”).52 Regions registration statement and prospectus pertaining to the 
offering referenced the prior 10-K that contained both a goodwill amount of $11.5 billion and an 
increase of over $400 million in the loan loss provision.
53
  
 In the end of 2008, Regions’ stock plummeted following its 4th quarter filings – filings 
that disclosed a $5.6 billion net loss resulting from an impairment of good will, and an increased 
loan loss provision of $1.15 billion.
54
 Thereafter, plaintiff filed suit, alleging that Regions, in 
drafting its registration statement and prospectus, negligently gave false and misleading 
statements with respect to its goodwill and loan loss reserve figures, thus violating section 11 of 
the Securities Act.
55
  
 Regions then moved to dismiss, arguing that the monetary figures regarding goodwill and 
loan loss reserves were matters of opinion – and not actionable because plaintiff failed to prove 
                                                          
50
 Id. (agreeing that, following its acquisition, Regions “would record AmSouth’s assets and liabilities at fair value, 
and that any excess of purchase price over net fair value would be recorded as goodwill.”); “goodwill” is "an asset 
representing the future economic benefits arising from other assets acquired in a business combination that are not 
individually identified and separately recognized." Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d at 110 (quoting J.A. 940 
(Business Combinations, SFAS No. 141 ¶ 3j (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2007))); a “loss reserve” is “[A]n 
insurance company’s reserve that represents the estimated value of future payments, as for losses, incurred but not 
yet reported.” BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1115 (9th edition 2010).  
51
 Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d at 107.  
52
 Id. at 107; A hybrid security is: “A security that combines two or more different financial instruments. Hybrid 
securities generally combine both debt and equity characteristics. The most common example is a convertible bond 
that has features of an ordinary bond, but is heavily influenced by the price movements of the stock into which it is 
convertible.” http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hybridsecurity.asp.  
53
 Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d at 107. 
54
 Id.; “GAAP also requires that goodwill be tested for impairment annually, or "more frequently if events or 
changes in circumstances indicate that the asset might be impaired.”” Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d at 110 
(quoting J.A. 538 (Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets, SFAS No. 142 ¶ 17 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 
2001))). 
55
 Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d at 108.  
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that, subjectively, Regions knew they were providing inconsistent figures at the time of 
disclosure.
56
 District Court Judge Kaplan determined that “the statements in question were not 
actionable because the complaint failed to allege that defendant[] did not honestly hold those 
opinions at the time they were expressed.”57  
 On appeal, plaintiff argued that Regions’ incorporation of its 10-K in the offering led to 
violations of section 11 in its registration statement.
58
 The Second Circuit, however, correctly 
held that estimates of goodwill do not involve material misrepresentations, “but rather a 
misstatement regarding Regions’ opinion.”59 Estimates of goodwill are solely based upon 
management’s determination of the fair market value of the acquired assets and expected 
liabilities, not factually determined figures.
60
  
 The Second Circuit correctly determined that plaintiff failed to properly allege that 
Regions intentionally misstated or misrepresented its goodwill and loan loss reserve figures at 
the time of disclosure.
61
 Furthermore, several courts, including prior decisions in the Second 
Circuit involving identical allegations, have held that, for a plaintiff to successfully establish a 
section 11 claim, plaintiff must prove that defendant’s statement was [1] false; and [2] not 
                                                          
56
 Id. at 108.  
57
 Id. at 109.  
58
 Id.  
59
 Id.  
60
 Id. at 110; see, e.g., Henry v. Champlain Enters., Inc., 445 F.3d 610, 619 (2d Cir. 2006) ("There is no universally 
infallible index of fair market value. There may be a range of prices with reasonable claims to being fair market 
value." (quoting Rhodes v. Amoco Oil Co., 143 F.3d 1369, 1372 (10th Cir. 1998))); In re Time Warner Inc., 9 F.3d 
259, 266 (2d Cir. 1993)(holding that "expressions of opinion and . . . projections" in a company's statements about 
its future prospects were not actionable because "the complaint contain[ed] no allegations to support the inference 
that the defendants either did not have the[] favorable opinions on future prospects when they made the statements 
or that the favorable opinions were without a basis in fact."); Kowal v. IBM (In re IBM Corporate Securities 
Litigation), 163 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1998) (holding that a company's alleged statements that were merely 
projections were not actionable under the 1933 or 1934 Acts.)  
61
 Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d at 113.  
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believed when it was disclosed.
62
 Therefore, plaintiff in this case failed to state a claim – and the 
Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.   
 
 
2. The Ninth Circuit: Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp, Ltd. 
 In Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp, Ltd.
63
, plaintiffs, minority shareholders, alleged that 
defendant violated section 11 of the Securities Act for having provided misleading information 
in its registration statement. Defendant, Capitol Bancorp (hereinafter “Capitol”), a bank holding 
company, created and controlled smaller community banks, including Napa Community Bank 
(hereinafter “NCB”), the subject of the suit.64 After creating NCB, Capitol solicited investors in 
the local community, having informed potential investors of its business intentions – for the 
investors to control 49% of NCB with the remaining 51% of NCB’s stock to be purchased by 
Capitol, thus causing Capitol to become the controlling shareholder in NCB.
65
  
 Simultaneously, Capitol established a holding company called First California Northern 
(hereinafter “FCN”).66 Capitol then solicited investors who would own 49% of the company with 
Capitol owning the majority 51%.
67
 Capitol then offered its FCN investors the opportunity to 
                                                          
62
 Id. at 113; see Va. Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1098, 1108-09 (1991). There, the Court reasoned that, 
“. . . [t]he evidence invoked by [shareholders] in the instant case fell short of compelling the jury to find the facial 
materiality of the misleading statement neutralized.” (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (noting that “the statement "In 
the opinion of the Directors, this is a high value for the shares" would produce liability if in fact it was not a high 
value and the directors knew that. It would not produce liability if in fact it was not a high value but the directors 
honestly believed otherwise.”; see MHC Mut. Conversion Fund, L.P. v. United W. Bancorp, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 
1026, 1036 (D. Colo. 2012) (holding that under governing law, a plaintiff asserting a claim . . . that is based on an 
opinion, must allege that the opinion is objectively and subjectively false.”) 
63
 551 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2009) 
64
 Id. at 1159.  
65
 Id.  
66
 Id.  
67
 Id.  
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exchange their FCN shares for Capitol shares.
68
 As a result, Capitol gained absolute control 
(100%) of FCN.
69
  
 Less than a year later, Capitol offered the minority shareholders of NCB (hereinafter 
referred to as “plaintiffs”) an exchange offer (the “offer”) – in hopes that this offer, identical to 
the FCN offer, would produce a similar result.
70
 The offer was for the exchange of Capitol shares 
at a rate of 150% of the book value of NCB’s common stock.71 Plaintiffs, having believed that 
the offer was unfair, formed a “minority shareholders committee.”72 The committee obtained its 
own fairness opinion that set forth the fair market value (“FMV”) of the NCB shares at a rate of 
$21 per share (roughly 33% higher than the original offer).
73
  
 While some of the minority shareholders exchanged their shares, others did not.
74
 After 
the offer ended, Capitol had acquired 87% of NCB’s shares, leaving 13% in the hands of the 
remaining shareholders.
75
 The minority shareholders, including those who agreed to exchange 
their NCB shares for Capitol shares, filed suit alleging that, inter alia, defendant violated section 
11 of the Securities Act for providing misleading statements in its registration statement.
76
 The 
Northern District of California, however, immediately dismissed plaintiffs’ claims because they 
failed to plead their claim with particularity, as required by Federal Rule Civil Procedure 9(b).
77
  
After amending their complaint – by merely adding a separate claim – the district court again 
dismissed plaintiffs complaint because they failed to allege with particularity the securities 
                                                          
68
 Rubke, 551 F.3d at 1159.  
69
 Id.  
70
 Id.  
71
 Id.  
72
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violations that defendant had allegedly committed.
78
 Thereafter, plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.
79
  
 On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the district court erroneously dismissed their First 
Amended Complaint that alleged that defendant Capitol’s registration statement, “contained 
material misrepresentations in violation of section 11 of the Securities Act.”80 Specifically, 
plaintiffs alleged that six different statements in defendant’s registration statement were “either 
affirmatively misleading or were misleading by omission.”81 One of plaintiffs’ allegations was 
that defendant’s registration statement misled plaintiffs’ by including two fairness opinions that 
determined that the transaction was “financially fair.”82 But what plaintiff failed to prove was 
that the defendant thought otherwise.  
Plaintiffs’ second allegation was that defendant’s registration statement failed to provide 
that one year prior, defendant implemented an analogous offer for shares of NCB’s holding 
company, First California Northern – paying nearly 167% of book value for those shares.83 This 
information, however, does not need to be disclosed in the registration statement because this 
information bears no significance on the present offer.  
Plaintiffs’ third allegation was that defendant’s statement in the registration statement 
that defendant “believes that NCB’s profitability will increase” failed to “adequately disclose” 
NCB’s dramatic growth in profitability.84 Essentially what plaintiff alleged here is that defendant 
didn’t disclose how much profitability would increase85 – something that defendant is not 
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required to disclose in the registration statement because it income projections may be 
considered forward looking statements.
86
  
Plaintiffs’ fourth accusation was that defendant misled plaintiffs’ into believing that they 
were required to sell their NCB shares to defendant after three years and that defendant had a 
duty to disclose that plaintiffs’, in no way, had any obligation of selling their shares to 
defendant.
87
 The Court correctly pointed out that plaintiffs’, in making this allegation, failed to 
prove that defendant “misled” them.88 Furthermore, according to the registration statement and 
supporting documents, “accepting the tender offer was optional.”89 
 Plaintiffs’ fifth allegation alleged that defendant’s registration statement “contained 
misleading references to a ‘premium’ that caused NCB minority shareholders [plaintiffs’] to 
believe that accepting the tender offer would give them a premium on the shares’ fair value.”90 
Again, the Court corrected the ridiculous allegation by noting that the registration statement 
clearly identified that plaintiff minority shareholders would be given a premium on the “book 
value” of the shares, not the fair value.91  
 Lastly, plaintiffs’ sixth and final allegation claimed that defendant made misleading 
statements through telephone communications.
92
 Apparently, a NCB board member telephoned 
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several plaintiff minority shareholders in an attempt to persuade them to sell their shares to 
defendant because otherwise, their shares would be worthless.
93
  
 The Ninth Circuit pointed out, however . . .  
To prevail in such an action, a plaintiff must prove: [1] that 
the registration statement contained an omission or 
misrepresentation, and [2] that the omission or 
misrepresentation was material, that is, it would have misled 
a reasonable investor about the nature of his or her 
investment.
94
 
 
 Furthermore, Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff to plead his allegation(s) with particularity if 
the case “sounds in fraud,” which plaintiffs have failed to do.95 Incidentally, plaintiffs’ also made 
claims pursuant to section 10(b) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act
96
, but the Court correctly 
determined that plaintiffs’ failed to allege with particularity that defendant “made materially 
misleading statements and omission in connection with the Exchange Offer.”97 
 
3. The Sixth Circuit: Indiana State Dist. Council v. Omnicare, Inc.  
 Similarly, in Indiana State Dist. Council v. Omnicare, Inc.
98
, plaintiff shareholders 
alleged that defendant Omnicare (“Omnicare”) violated §11 of the Securities Act for providing 
material misstatements and/or omissions in its registration statement.  
 Omnicare, a provider of pharmaceutical care services for long-term care facilities, 
initiated a public offering in 2005 through which several investors, including plaintiffs, 
purchased Omnicare securities.
99
 One month later, however, plaintiffs sold their securities.
100
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Plaintiffs then filed suit – alleging that Omnicare failed to disclose its engagement in illegal 
activities; and that the statements given in the registration statement pertaining to Omnicare’s 
compliance with the law, were false and misleading.
101
 Omnicare moved to dismiss; and the 
district court granted its request, determining that plaintiffs failed to plead “loss causation.”102  
 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit determined that the lower court erroneously held that 
plaintiff was required to prove loss causation – and thus, remanded the case for additional 
analysis.
103
 Plaintiffs then amended their section 11 claim – but were again struck down by the 
district court (for the second time) that held that plaintiffs’ claim “sounds in fraud”104 and 
requires that plaintiffs allege their claim with “heightened particularity” pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 9(b).
105
 Furthermore, the court held that plaintiff was required to plead 
“knowledge of falsity on the part of” Omnicare, which plaintiffs failed to allege.106  
 Plaintiffs again appealed, arguing that Rule 9(b) did not apply because their amended 
complaint specifically stated, “Plaintiffs expressly exclude and disclaim any allegation that could 
be construed as alleging fraud or intentional or reckless misconduct, as this claim is based solely 
on the theories of strict liability and negligence under the Securities Act.”107 “This one-sentence 
                                                          
101
 Id.  
102
 Id.; see supra note 6-7.  
103
 Ind. State Dist. Council, 719 F.3d at 502.  
104
 “Although section 11 does not contain an element of fraud, a plaintiff may nonetheless be subject to Rule 9(b)’s 
particularity mandate if his complaint “sounds in fraud”:  
 
The plaintiff may allege a unified course of fraudulent conduct and rely 
entirely on that course of conduct as the basis of a claim. In that event, 
the claim is said to be "grounded in fraud" or to "sound in fraud," and the 
pleading of that claim as a whole must satisfy the particularity 
requirement of Rule 9(b). 
 
SEC v. Patel, 2008 DNH 53, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23553, *12-13 (D.N.H. 2008) (quoting Vess v. Ciba-Geigy 
Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2003)).  
105
 Ind. State Dist. Council, 719 F.3d at 502.  
106
 Id.  
107
 Id.  
 18  
 
disclaimer, however, does not achieve Plaintiffs' desired result.”108 The plaintiffs, therefore, were 
still subject to the heightened pleading requirement.
109
 The court ultimately determined that, “in 
order to meet the particularity of Rule 9(b), ‘a plaintiff [must] allege the time, place, and content 
of the alleged misrepresentations on which he or she relied; the fraudulent scheme; the fraudulent 
intent of the defendant; and the injury resulting from the fraud.’”110  
 Plaintiffs, however, argued that the district court’s decision requiring plaintiffs to prove 
defendant’s knowledge (subjective intent) of misrepresentation and falsity in the registration 
statement was erroneous because section 11 provides for strict liability.
111
 In response, defendant 
argued that section 10b of the Exchange Act and corresponding SEC Rule 10b-5 sets forth 
similar pleading requirements that plaintiff must prove in order to hold defendant liable. 
Defendant insists that the court should mirror the pleading requirements of section 10b (and 10b-
5) with that of section 11.
112
 Plaintiffs alleged that defendant’s statements of legal compliance in 
the registration statement misled investors to believe that defendant complied with the law – 
which later turned out to be untrue when it was determined that defendant had “engaged in 
illegal activities.”113 The district court, as noted above, determined that plaintiffs’ were required 
to prove that the defendant “knew that the statements of legal compliance were false at the time 
they were made.”114 Plaintiffs, however, argued that section 11 was a strict liability statute and 
                                                          
108
 Id.; see Cal. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 160 (3rd Cir. 2004) ("[A]n examination of the 
factual allegations that support Plaintiffs' section 11 claims establishes that the claims are indisputably immersed in . 
. . fraud. The one-sentence disavowment of fraud contained [in] . . . the . . . [c]omplaint does not require us to infer" 
otherwise) (footnote omitted) 
109
 Ind. State Dist. Council, 719 F.3d at 503.  
110
 Id. at 503 (quoting Sanderson v. HCA-The Healthcare Co., 447 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  
111
 Id.  
112
 This is the central theme of my comment. Courts should be analyzing § 11 violations in the same way that courts 
analyze § 10b of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 violations. The several elements that plaintiff must prove 
should also be construed in § 11 claims; See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text; see infra Part IV.  
113
 Ind. State Dist. Council, 719 F.3d at 503.  
114
 Id.  
 19  
 
thus, they were not required to prove defendant’s knowledge or intent.115 In response, defendant 
argued that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 have elements “parallel” to 
that of section 11 – and that because “soft” information was not required to be disclosed pursuant 
to these two rules, “a defendant corporation that chooses to keep completely silent regarding soft 
information cannot be held liable for a material omission under those provisions.”116 The Sixth 
Circuit ultimately agreed with the plaintiff having reasoned that section 11 “does not require a 
plaintiff to plead a defendant’s state of mind.”117 Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit noted that while 
the defendant properly relied on both Rubke and Fait (that both relied on Virginia Bankshares) in 
arguing that the Sixth Circuit should follow precedent, the Sixth Circuit stated, “While 
Defendants are correct that we are bound by Supreme Court precedent, we see nothing in 
Virginia Bankshares that alters the outcome in the instant case, and we decline to follow the 
Second and Ninth Circuits as a result.”118 
 
IV.  Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg: The Precedent  
In Va. Bankshares v. Sandberg,
119
 defendant First American Bankshares, Inc. (hereinafter 
“FABI”) began a freeze-out merger120, in which the First American Bank of Virginia merged 
into Virginia Bankshares, Inc. (VBI). VBI owned 85% of the First American Bank’s shares, with 
the remaining 15% being owned by 2,000 minority shareholders.
121
 As in any freeze-out merger, 
the minority shareholders lost their interests in the Bank as a result of the merger.
122
 Defendant 
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conducted its due diligence by having hired an investment banking firm to give an opinion on the 
appropriate price for the minority shareholders’ shares.123 After conducting a thorough analysis, 
the firm opined that $42 a share was a fair price for the stock.
124
 VBI then solicited proxies to the 
minority shareholders regarding the merger proposal – which thereinafter, had been approved.125 
Plaintiff, however, withheld returning her proxy and sought damages pursuant to section 14(a) 
having alleged that defendant knew that the offer price was not fair.
126
 The jury returned a 
verdict for plaintiff – having determined that plaintiff would have received $60 per share if the 
stock had been valued adequately.
127
  
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s liability for 
materially misleading the minority shareholders regarding two distinct statements, one being the 
following: “The Plan of Merger has been approved by the Board of Directors because it provides 
an opportunity for the Bank’s public shareholders to achieve a high value for their shares.” 
Defendants urged that “[s]tatements of opinion or belief incorporating indefinite . . . expressions 
cannot be actionable as misstatements of material fact . . . and that such a declaration or opinion . 
. . should never be actionable . . . to enable readers to draw their own, independent conclusions.”  
At issue is not whether the so-called misstatement was material, but whether or not a defendant 
can and should be held liable for statements of opinion or belief that may turn out to be false. 
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This, I believe, is why the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. Before getting into its 
discussion, the U.S. Supreme Court stated,  
[T]he Court of Appeals affirmed petitioners' liability for 
two statements found to have been materially misleading in 
violation of § 14(a) of the Act . . . Petitioners argue that 
statements of opinion or belief incorporating indefinite and 
unverifiable expressions cannot be actionable as 
misstatements of material fact within the meaning of Rule 
14a-9, and that such a declaration of opinion or belief should 
never be actionable when placed in a proxy solicitation 
incorporating statements of fact sufficient to enable readers 
to draw their own, independent conclusions.
128
 
 
The Court reasoned that while a plaintiff can prove that a defendant’s statement is knowingly 
false or misleading – “even when stated in conclusory terms” – “disbelief or undisclosed 
motivation, standing  alone, [is] insufficient to satisfy the element of fact that must be established 
under section 14(a).”129  
Defendant’s argument primarily relied on Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores urging the 
Court to recognize the policy reasons why they should not be held liable.
130
 In essence, the 
defendant, along with Blue Chip Stamps, “deflected the threat of vexatious litigation over "many 
rather hazy issues of historical fact the proof of which depended almost entirely on oral 
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This Court held against expanding the class from actual buyers and 
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action, either to sell what they own or to buy what they do not. 
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testimony."
131
 Concerning this policy concern, however, the Court held that no such threat to 
litigation exists because they are: 
. . . [c]haracteristically matters  of corporate record 
subject to documentation, to be supported or attacked by 
evidence of historical fact outside a plaintiff's control. Such 
evidence would include not only corporate minutes and other 
statements of the directors themselves, but circumstantial 
evidence bearing on the facts that would reasonably underlie 
the reasons claimed and the honesty of any statement that 
those reasons are the basis for a recommendation or other 
action, a point that becomes especially clear when the 
reasons or beliefs go to valuations in dollars and cents.
132
 
 
Furthermore, the statement by defendant did not focus on the “dollars and cents,” but rather 
the opinion of what a “high” value would be.133 According to the complaint, the shares were 
worth more than $60 per share and plaintiffs’ believed that the defendants being the experts they 
are, would understand that $40 per share is not a “high” value, but rather a “fair” value.134 After 
much discussion of what constitutes a “fair value” or “high value” per share, the Court added 
that, because liability under section 14(a) can only be established by proving both deceptiveness 
and materiality, defendant’s argument that “publishing accurate facts in a proxy statement can 
render a misleading proposition too unimportant to ground liability” was sound.135 Moreover, the 
Court stated that, “. . . [t]he temptation to rest an otherwise nonexistent section 14(a) action on 
psychological enquiry alone would threaten just the sort of strike suits and attrition by discovery 
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that Blue Chip Stamps sought to discourage.”136 Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
defendant’s statement did not mislead plaintiffs’ – and reversed the Court of Appeals decision.137 
 
V. The Proposed Solution: Increasing the Bar to Mirror the Pleading Requirements in 
Section 10b/Rule 10b-5 Claims  
 
 As thoroughly explained in the above discussion, the Sixth Circuit neglected to follow the 
previously held determinations as analyzed in both the Second and Ninth Circuits.
138
 The Sixth 
Circuit significantly lowered the bar for plaintiffs who seek to pursue a section 11 claim against a 
company for providing materially “misleading” or omitting material “soft” information in a 
registration statement.
139
 My proposed solution is to increase the bar for a plaintiff alleging a 
section 11 violation. As the Second and Ninth Circuits correctly determined, a plaintiff is 
required to prove the following: [1] plead with particularity pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9(b)
140
; [2] subjective intent
141
; and [3] objective intent.
142
 However, courts should 
take it a step further and require that plaintiff prove both scienter and loss causation. If the 
defendant did not intend to give false information in the registration statement, then there should 
be no liability. Moreover, the plaintiff should be required to prove “loss causation,” meaning that 
the plaintiff suffered from some degree of monetary loss. How a court can remedy a plaintiff 
financially if the plaintiff did not suffer monetarily is what is quite concerning. From a policy 
perspective, there will be an influx of litigation should courts begin to follow the newly held 
Sixth Circuit decision. Plaintiffs’ will have little to nothing to prove and defendants’ will be held 
                                                          
136
 Id.  
137
 Id. at 1108.  
138
 Id.  
139
 Ind. State Dist. Council v. Omnicare, 719 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2013).  
140
 See, supra notes 37 & 40.  
141
 The actual intent of the defendant when writing the registration statement.  
142
 What a reasonable investor would have thought after reading the registration statement – would they have 
thought that the defendant knowingly provided a false opinion or belief.  
 24  
 
liable for mere “mistakes” made in a registration statement – even when no one was financially 
hurt by the mistake.  
 While my recommendations may be a step in the right direction, it is clear that a 
countervailing argument will address the necessity to contrast the statutory language of section 
10b with that of section 11. Section 10b requires the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9b 
because “Any purchaser of a security may bring a section 10(b) action against any person who 
has used any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the sale of a security.” 143 That 
being said, in a section 10b complaint, it is likely that a plaintiff will be alleging fraud and thus 
will be required to abide by Rule 9(b).
144
 In contrast, a section 11 claim does not sound in fraud. 
Therefore, although section 10b and section 11 overlap in some respect, they represent “separate 
causes of action; and therefore, it is reasonable to apply a different pleading standard to each 
section.
145
 But, why is it necessary for section 11 to have such a distinct and liaberal pleading 
standard from a section 10b claim? Section 11 should not place such minimal burdens on a 
plaintiff. It will lead to nothing more than an influx of litigation. As previously mentioned, a 
plaintiff should be required to prove additional elements before a court can hold a defendant 
liable for something that the defendant shouldn’t be held liable for. Regardless of the 
“differences in statutory language and legislative history of section 11 and section 10(b) . . .,”146 
it would be outlandish to lower the standard for a plaintiff when establishing a section 11 claim. 
 Although some believe that Congress intended to lower the bar for plaintiffs in a section 
11 claim to facilitate full and fair disclosure of securities, to say that “Without civil liability, 
issuers will not comply with the Securities Act and the United States financial markets will 
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suffer . . .”147 is nothing more than an ill-informed statement that assumes every issuer will try to 
take advantage of shareholders when disclosing information in a registration statement.  While I 
understand that there is a need to “protect investors and the integrity of the regulatory 
scheme,”148 there should also be a need to protect issues selling their shares to the public. To 
think that only issuers engage in fraud is a false belief. Lowering the bar to this extent may cause 
shareholders to bring frivolous lawsuits against issuers and engage in fraud themselves.  
 
VI. Conclusion  
 In sum, this comment proposes a new analytical framework to apply to plaintiff’s 
pleading requirements when alleging a material misrepresentation or omission (pertaining to 
“soft” information) under section 11 of the ’33 Act. While the Second and Ninth Circuits have 
correctly determined that a plaintiff should be required to prove both subjective and objective 
intent when pursuing a section 11 claim, this comment discusses the importance and need for 
additional pleading requirements – scienter and loss causation. The Sixth Circuit erroneously 
lowered the bar by essentially holding that a plaintiff, if unhappy with the defendant’s 
registration statement, can pursue a section 11 claim without having to prove subjective intent, 
objective intent, scienter, or even loss causation. If courts can find neutral ground by giving a 
plaintiff specific pleading requirements for challenging soft information pursuant to section 11, 
we can prevent this problem entirely.  
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